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of individual essences elsewhere. 5 
The AudiIWainwright collection ought to be useful to almost anybody doing 
research in philosophical theology. It explores new directions in religious epis-
temology, ethics, and metaphysics, and with greater historical sensitivity than 
is often the case in analytic philosophy of religion. It ought to stimulate a great 
deal of further work. 
NOTES 
I. Cr. Alvin Plantinga. "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," Proceedings of the Amer-
ican Catholic Philosophical Association. 1980. 
2. "In Search of the foundations of Theism." Faith and Philosophy. II. 4 (October, 1985), p. 480. 
3. "On Taking Belief in God as Basic." delivered at the Institute in Philosophy of Religion. 
Bellingham. Washington. summer 1986; also part of Gifford Lectures and Payton Lectures. 1987. 
4. A good example is Bernard Williams. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University 
Press, 1985. 
5. "Individual Essence and the Creation," in Thomas V. Morris. ed .. Divine and Human Action: 
Essays in the Metaphysics of Thei.lm, Cornell University Press. 1988. 
Philosophy and Miracle: The Contemporary Debate, by David and Randall 
Basinger. (Problems in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 2.) Lewiston, New York 
and Queenston, Ontario, The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986. Pp. 124. $39.95 
Reviewed by WILLIAM J. WAINWRIGHT, University of Wisconsin-Mil-
waukee. 
This book assesses recent discussions of miracles. David Basinger is primarily 
responsible for chapters I and IV and Randall Basinger for chapter Y. The authors 
are jointly responsible for chapters II and III. 
The Basingers have several controversial theses. Chapter I argues that even 
though it makes sense to speak of God directly causing events that are "perma-
nently inexplicable by science," the concept of a violation of natural law is 
incoherent. (The Basingers admit that we can coherently talk of divinely caused 
nonrepeatable counterinstances to natural laws. They argue, however, that these 
shouldn't be called violations since this implies that the laws and the event's 
occurrence are formally inconsistent. I doubt whether most theists have used 
"violation" this strictly. However, the objections of critics like Flew show that 
the term can easily lead to misunderstanding.) 
The authors also contend that though one might have sufficient evident that 
reported occurrences are incompatible with well established nomologicals 
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(chapter II), we wouldn't be justified in concluding that they were permanently 
inexplicable by science (chapter III). Chapter IV argues that "while theists may 
under some circumstances be able justifiably to affirm, for themselves, that God 
has directly intervened, it cannot be argued that conditions exist under which 
all theists would be forced to admit that God has directly done so." A fortiori, 
no conditions exist under which all people would be obliged to do so. (The 
argument of chapter IV heavily depends on that of chapter III. It is largely 
because they think we can't rule out the possibility of scientific explanation that 
the Basingers doubt the possibility of evidence that would compel all theists to 
speak of divine intervention.) 
These claims raise serious issues. For example, the Basingers contend that 
"as long as seeming counterinstances are not repeatable, the scientist can (and 
indeed should) continue to affirm the adequacy of the laws in question while 
continuing to search for new or modified laws to accommodate the recalcitrant 
events." This seems mistaken. Either there is strong evidence for the nonrepeata-
bility of a seeming counterinstance or there isn't. If there is, the scientist has 
excellent reasons for continuing "to affirm the adequacy of the laws in question." 
But by the same token, he or she also has excellent reasons for thinking that 
the laws can't be revised to accommodate the recalcitrant events. (The Basingers 
insist that "only repeatable counterinstances falsify scientific laws," presumably 
because scientific laws are only designed to deal with repeatable events.) If, on 
the other hand, there is only weak evidence for the occurrence's nonrepeatability, 
the scientist should "search for new or modified laws to accommodate" the event. 
It is doubtful, however, whether he or she should also "continue to affirm the 
adequacy" of the laws to which the event is a seeming counterinstance. (Though 
it may be reasonable to still use them.) 
The most striking contention is developed in chapter V. Classical theists believe 
that God sometimes performs miracles to forestall or mitigate natural evils. But 
they also believe His power and goodness are unlimited. Why, then, doesn't 
God perform miracles more often? The authors seem to think that classical theists 
must answer this question in one of two ways. The "uniformity defense" states 
that "if nature is to support and make possible free, moral agents, it must be 
characterized, by and large, by [natural] order and uniformity." Natural evil is 
an unwanted but unavoidable consequence. Other classical theists think that God 
prearranges things so that "events in nature will uniformly and predictably unfold 
in correlation" with our actions and choices. On this view, natural evil is an 
indirect consequence of people's behavior. Both views explain why miracles 
rarely occur. According to the first, frequent miracles are inconsistent with the 
uniform operation of natural law. Since the latter is necessary for freedom, 
wholesale intervention would result in the loss of a great good. According to 
the second, natural evils are appropriate to the psycho-physical, moral and 
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spiritual conditions of free agents. Since they are appropriate, their occurrence 
isn't evil all things considered. Both views can thus account for the rarity of 
miracles. But both have unpalatable consequences. 
Why is this the case? (1) The uniformity defense implies that God doesn't 
"directly" or "specifically" ordain, or "unilaterally determine," most evils. They 
are instead "unwanted but unavoidable by-products of a world which, as a whole, 
is good." (2) But if so, "God is not in total control of how nature affects particular 
persons" and hence isn't truly omnipotent. (3) The prearrangement hypothesis 
protects God's power but destroys the distinction between general and special 
providence. All events are responses to "the specific needs [and conditions] of 
particular persons." (4) It also implies that evils "flow directly and specifically 
from the divine will." (5) And yet if God "is directly responsible for all specific 
evils," His goodness is "placed in jeopardy." 
I don't find this convincing. For example, 2 seems false. The most that follows 
from the uniformity defense is that the evils which result from nature's operations 
aren't willed for their own sake or as means to an end (in the strict sense, that 
is, as something produced or permitted to bring about a certain result). The evil 
which results from nature's operations may be unavoidable but are the Basingers 
suggesting that God's power is imperfect if He is unable to achieve certain goods 
without permitting evils? If so, most forms of the greater goods defense are in 
trouble. 
3 seems true only if the prearrangement hypothesis implies that each good 
and evil that befalls someone is ordained because it is appropriate to his or her 
psycho-physical, moral and spiritual condition. I doubt whether many Western 
theists have held this. A more common view, surely, is that while some goods 
and evils are of this sort, others are ordained to secure a more general good or 
the good of some other person. Only the former are direct responses to "the 
specific needs [and conditions] of particular persons." 
4 is false if "flowing directly from the divine will" implies "unilateral determi-
nation." As the Basingers recognize, on one version of the prearrangement view, 
God coordinates events with actions which He foresees but does not determine. 
In this version, our actions are partial causes (or conditions) of at least some of 
the evils that befall us. 
It is also difficult to see the force of 5. As Jonathan Edwards points out, God 
is responsible for any evil He could prevent. But in any more or less traditional 
form of theism, God can prevent all evil by not creating. He is thus responsible 
for it. The authors' point may be that while the uniformity defense makes evils 
by-products of God's creative activity, the prearrangement hypothesis implies 
that they are deliberately chosen means; His responsibility is thus greater. But 
is one less responsible for the foreseen by-products of one's activity than for 
one's means? In any case, it isn't clear that even total responsibility endangers 
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God's goodness if God has a morally sufficient reason for ordaining or permitting 
evil. On the prearrangement hypothesis, He clearly has. 
The Basingers' theses are, then, controversial. But their book has several 
virtues. Flew and the other philosophers discussed are treated carefully and fairly, 
and the authors' arguments are often thought provoking. While I am not convinced 
by their contentions, I suspect that many readers of this journal will find some 
of them more persuasive than I do. 
Knowing the Unknowable God. Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas, by David B. 
Burrell, C.S.C. Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1986. Pp. x and 130. cl. $15.95. 
Reviewed by ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI, The Catholic University of America. 
This book is a historical and systematic study of the way the Muslim, Jewish 
and Christian religious traditions worked together in the middle ages to yield 
the theological understanding of God as esse subsistens. In his Introduction, 
Burrell observes that the central theme to be addressed is how God and the word 
are to be distinguished. As a context for this distinction, he examines, in Chapter 
1, an "imaginative scheme" or "background picture" that was shared by Jews, 
Christians, and Muslims, a scheme in which all the parts of the cosmos emanated 
from a divine source. This picture emphasized the connection between the world 
and God and provided "an enveloping tapestry" in which people were able to 
locate themselves. Burrell says that Aquinas' emphasis on the otherness of God 
worked against this scheme; Aquinas claims that God creates not through inter-
mediaries but directly. In Chapter 2 Burrell discusses Ibn Sina, who is said to 
anticipate the full understanding of the distinction between the world and God. 
He shows how Ibn Sina modifies the metaphysics of both Alfarabi and Aristotle; 
Ibn Sina claims that existence is not a presupposition simply, but that it can be 
thought about as something that happens to a thing. Existence becomes an issue. 
In this same chapter, Burrell also discusses Aquinas and Maimonides as ques-
tioning existence, and he also speaks about the function of the act of judgment 
in becoming aware of existence as an issue. 
In Chapter 3 he examines Aquinas more closely. One of the best points in 
this chapter is the distinction Burrell draws between ordinary properties and 
formal properties, those that "are not so much said of a subject, as they are 
reflected in a subject's very mode of existing, and govern the way in which 
anything whatsoever might be said of that subject" (p. 47). The attributes of 
God are formal properties. Here, as in many other passages in the book, Burrell 
neatly puts logical themes to theological use. Chapter 4, on the names of God, 
concentrates on Maimonides. Burrell tries not only to discuss how it is that many 
names can be said of God, but also to show how this issue is related to the 
